HUMAN EVENTS

FRANK C. HANIGHEN, *Editor* *Contributing Editors:* FRANK CHODOROV, WILLIS J. BALLINGER

Volume XII, No. 14 Saturday, April 2, 1955 1835 K St. N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

News Section

The Colonels' Report: The almost incredible Yalta papers as now published do not include one highly illuminating document, which we reproduce below. It may serve as a warning, just at this juncture, of the carelessness of statesmen who rushed into a Big Four Conference and appeased an arrogant foreign power, without weighing decisions in the light of professional military advice.

The document was known in G2 (Military Intelligence) as the Colonels' Report, for it was prepared by a group of veteran Intelligence officers, most of them Regular Army Colonels. Preparation was started about the time the Four Bigs set out for the famous Black Sea conference. It reads, as follows:

Intelligence Report:

1. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill effect of which would be felt for decades to come. Its military significance at this state of the war would be relatively unimportant.

2. Many military experts believe that the U.S. and Great Britain without further help possess the power to force unconditional surrender upon Japan, or to occupy the islands and mainland possessions.

3. It may be expected that Soviet Russia will enter the Asiatic war, but at her own good time and probably only when the hard fighting stage is over.

4. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war at so late a moment would shorten hostilities but little, and affect only a slight saving of American lives.

5. It is not believed that any diplomatic action we either take or fail to take, or any concessions we make now or in the foreseeable future, will influence Soviet Russia to speed up or retard entry into the the Asiatic war.

6. Strong enough to crush Japan ourselves, the United States should make no political or economic concessions to Soviet Russia to bring about or prevent an action which she is fully determined to take anyway.

7. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would destroy America's position in Asia quite as effectively as our position is now destroyed in Europe east of the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic.

8. If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will certainly lose her independence to become the Poland of Asia; Korea, the Asiatic Romania; Manchukuo, the Soviet Bulgaria. Whether more than a nominal China will exist after the impact of the Russian armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang may well have to depart and a Chinese government may be installed in Nanking which we would have to recognize.

9. To take a line of action which would save few lives now, and only a little time — at an unpredictable cost in lives, treasure and honor in the future — and simultaneously destroy our ally, China, would be an act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for world peace a tragic farce.

10. Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet Union to destroy China. This would certainly injure the material and moral position of the United States in Asia.

11. It should be reiterated that the United States Army is by no means united in believing it wise to encourage the Soviet Union to enter the Asiatic war.

12. The President of the United States would be well advised, before he made any commitments to Russia in Asia which would clearly have dire political and moral consequences for the United States, to consult that particular American field commander who is steeped in every phase of the Asiatic war and in the political background of that struggle.

Recommendation: General MacArthur should be summoned to Washington immediately. The President should consider the all-important matter of Soviet Russia's entry into the Asiatic war with General MacArthur eye to eye. All other political and military personages should be excluded from the conferences.

The above document is, and has been for almost four years, a part of the published record of the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, and was introduced into the record by Senator Styles Bridges in June, 1951 (Volume 4, pages 2916-17 of the Hearings of that Committee, known as the "Mac-

Published weekly at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
Copyright 1955 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arthur Hearings," since the group heard testimony from General MacArthur [following his dismissal by Truman] on his conduct of the war in Korea.)

This report was prepared and written by Colonels Joseph Michela (leader of the group), Truman Smith, Harvey Smith, Edmund Delaney, Hugo Kenyon, Ivan Yeaton, Peter Vischer and other "area specialists" of Military Intelligence. The report was dated April 12, 1945, over two months after Yalta, although it had been under preparation for some months previously. The secret agreement made at Yalta to bring Russia into the Asiatic war was not known to G2 at the time, and indeed was only revealed in 1947.

The motive behind the preparation of the document was a desire to put before the "high level" a realistic view of the developing Asiatic situation. From about September, 1944, and increasingly as the months went by, the Colonels felt that Japan was beaten and that the only practical course was to try to arrange an "unconditional surrender" or some other diplomatic means to take Japan out of the war. The Colonels were appalled at the prevalent view of the "high level" that it was necessary to get Russia to enter the Asiatic war in order to finish the conflict against Japan. If they had been consulted by the "high level" before Yalta, the above advice would surely have been given — according to those members with whom HUMAN EVENTS has talked.

Colonel Michela presented the report to General Marshall in April and "briefed" the Chief of Staff on it. Marshall reportedly said little, but discouraged Michela's hopes that action along the above lines would be taken.

Thunder Over China: Admiral Carney actually did not say "war by April 15"; he simply offered the opinion that the Chinese Reds would have the military build-up for war by that date. Such was the real gist of his remarks to reporters who gave him a dinner. Carney's mistake (which led to Ike's rebuke) was that he went to dinner with an aggregation of "liberal" scribes — some of whom, essentially Democrats, were perhaps ready to "leak" the story.

● One of the old "China hands" in the Pentagon privately serves a warning about a thesis dear to the nation's editorial writers. The thesis is that Moscow does not want a general war to start over the islands. China Hand says "wrong" on two counts: (1) Russia, as well as the Pentagon, knows that *no general war need spread from a fight over the islands* — Moscow understands perfectly the "sea-air strategy" of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2) Russia — and this is the interesting "angle shot" — would not mind at all if the Chinese Reds were to receive a defeat at the hands of our fleet and air force. Peiping has been getting too cocky — for Moscow's taste — since its success in Korea. Also, the Russian generals did not like it when Malenkov (as a consequence, disgraced) gave the Chinese Reds military control over the Manchurian ports — historically regarded as the legitimate sphere of Russia from the time of the Tsars. Hence, if Peiping "gets a bloody nose," Moscow won't mind; it would serve to keep Peiping obedient to the Kremlin wishes.

● How does the public react to "war talk" and "peace talk". The Democrats claim "war talk" is very unpopular, but adduce no figures. Capitol Hill notes no great surge of mail. Senator Bridges' office produces one indication. Last Sunday on television, Bridges "talked tough" about standing firm against the Reds; he received about 1,000 wires, four to one supporting him.

● See Article Section for discussion of proposed Big Four Conference.

Not Merely Gossip: In the warren of bureaucracy on Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues, the big news this week was the attack on the legality of Eisenhower's $100 billion roads program, by — of all persons — one of his latest important appointees. The man is Mr. Joseph Campbell, only recently confirmed as Controller General. Papers in recent months made much of New Deal Democratic opposition to Campbell's confirmation; they said little about the unhappiness of the White House (New Deal) Palace Guard. The fact is that Campbell is a Republican conservative, vowed to economy and fiscal soundness. He likes the financial ideas of Democratic Conservative Senator Harry Byrd — and he's in for a 15-year term. The Knowland wing of the GOP regarded the Campbell appointment as one of the best Eisenhower has made.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

● Worry is reported down in the Central Intelligence Agency offices on the Potomac bank. CIA is the Government's supposedly secret "cloak and dagger" body. "Supposedly" — because, although some of its fund expenditures are enveloped in secrecy from members of Congress who vote its appropriations, yet big national magazines publish surprisingly frank feature stories about the Agency's operations. The worry now is that General Mark Clark's investigation task force will turn in a critical report on CIA. Clark is working for the Hoover Commission probing Government agencies and his report will be sent to the Hoover body and then to Congress, not to the White House. (Sometime ago, the Palace Guard got up a "whitewash" report on the body.) Clark is said to be a very independent sort of general and it is reported that Allen Dulles, head of CIA, is concerned. He has reason to be, for Congressional members have grown increasingly suspicious that large sums, not accounted for to Congress, are being wasted by the "hush-hush" agency.

● Another Ike appointment is having a hard time — that of Edward Corsi (Dewey henchman), now in the State Department as an expert on immigration problems. Representative Francis Walter (D., Pa.) head of the House Un-American Activities Committee has charged that Corsi was once listed as a member of a Commie front. The New York man is also critical of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, which carefully screens immigrants to this country. The staffers of Herbert Hoover, Jr., Undersecretary of State, reportedly would like to see Corsi eased out, with as little notice as possible. But the latter has powerful backing from the old Dewey crowd. It's a bitter internecine bureaucratic fight.

Labor Front: The Louisville & Nashville Railway strike, which, as reported by the Louisville *Times* (March 17) "has taken a paralyzing grip on a large part of the South," raises an interesting issue. Should health and welfare plans be compulsory in labor settlements between employer and workers?

In the L & N Case, rail unions have demanded that the railroads should contribute $3.40 a month, the employee $3.40. The $6.80 monthly contribution for each worker includes an 85 cent take-out for the national treasury of the unions.

But the L & N offers a plan of its own. The employee pays only $1.85 a month and the L & N $3.40 per month — a total of $5.25 as opposed to the $6.80 demanded by the union. The difference is accounted for by the facts that (1) hospitalization and medical care are cheaper in the South and (2) that the joint L & N employee contribution does not include 85 cents a month for the union treasury.

But the main difference between the union and the L & N plan is that the latter refuses to make the health and welfare contribution from the employee compulsory.

How the workers feel about the dispute appears in a letter to "the President of the U.S." which says *inter alia*, "We [the workers] are opposed to this strike. Union officials want to force us to contribute to a health and welfare insurance plan which would cost us more money than a similar plan which the L & N offers us on a volunteer basis. . . We say frankly that the attitude of the union bosses is a Fascist attitude." The letter was signed by 10 union and non-union members of the L & N Clerks Committee.

Labor observers here see in the struggle another outcropping — especially as phrased in the above workers letter — of the "right-to-work" movement, of the "voluntary" instead of the "compulsory" handling of terms in labor-employer arrangements. The "right-to-work" movement opposes compulsory membership in unions. There is no reason, it is said, why health and welfare benefits should be compulsory, that the average worker should be given the right to choose his own method of ensuring his physical welfare.

Trade With Russia: It comes as something of a shock to those who read the reports of the Department of Commerce to find that during the third quarter of 1954, the value of export applications approved to the European Soviet bloc of nations was $1,339,827. In view of the moral fervor invoked against this bloc in our not so cold war, it is asked, why any trade at all?

It is true that the figures for this period show a drop from the preceding quarter, and a listing shows no strategic items (although some wonder is expressed over one of $302,404 for "tobacco and cigarettes.") But, remark some observers, the smallness of the trade is beside the point. Won't this record provide a propaganda excuse for some of our so-called "allies" to justify their trade with Red China?

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Foreign Aid — British Style: "Now we have heard everything," is the comment on the following development. Under the foreign aid program it is required that part of the goods we *give away* be carried in American bottoms. The U.S. Government not only pays for the goods but the cargo costs as well.

The London *Sunday Dispatch* now reports that the British Government does not like the idea that we should give business to American ships transporting our handouts, and is actually refusing large quantities of such goods because Congress has directed that one half of them must be moved in U.S. ships.

The *Dispatch* reports that the United States Government "has been told that unless the rule is altered the U.S. economic aid plan is in danger of breaking down."

Holdover Propaganda: One of the tragedies of the Eisenhower Administration is how New Dealers manage to promote left-wing objectives right under its nose. This week, on March 29th at 2 P.M. in the building of the General Services Administration a film was shown to GSA personnel. The film was billed as educational — a film to educate GSA personnel on atomic developments.

The film exhibited CBS commentator Ed Murrow's interview with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer in the early part of this year. This show was, in effect, a defense of Oppenheimer, although the facts about the Oppenheimer case fully justified the Atomic Energy Commission in removing him from future work on our nuclear secrets. Some who saw the film and who knew these facts asked what the Oppenheimer case had to do with bringing them abreast of atomic developments. Such incidents inspire many conservative Republicans hereabouts to conclude sadly that the "time for a change" slogan of 1952 has only produced more of the same old thing characteristic of the preceding Democratic regimes.

Education Front: Last week, we reported how citizens and press in Virginia discovered a teacher's manual of instruction containing un-American and socialistic passages and caused recall of the volume. We reported only one of the offending quotations.

Some of the other passages may serve to reveal the nature of the kind of copy published in school textbooks. The Richmond *News Leader*, in the course of its campaign over the matter, drew attention to the following: "One finds on page 158 that among the understandings 'sixth grade children should develop' is an understanding that 'mass production increases the wealth of a few.' Sixth graders are told to 'locate on a map the large government dams and discuss their social and industrial benefits.' They are not asked to locate hydroelectric dams or power plants built by private capital.

"Sixth graders are asked to 'discuss why we should respect all kinds of labor and the people who carry on the work' and surely this is an admirable point for discussion; but nowhere is it suggested that employers and investors be respected also. It is also suggested that sixth graders contemplate 'the results of regimentation of masses of people, as in punching time clocks and piece work in factories.' In a discussion of safety, sixth graders are given another happy aspect of industrial life: many children, they are told, 'have seen parents and older brothers and sisters brought home from factories and mines when they have been injured by machinery'."

The Richmond paper goes on: "Seventh-graders also get the treatment. They should 'develop an understanding, the teachers are advised, that men's tendency to appropriate the products of science and invention has necessitated certain governmental controls.' They should understand that 'regulation is necessary to protect society from the evils of unequal distributions of social income.' They are asked to collect data 'showing how governmental controls have decreased the death rate caused by certain diseases, such as typhoid, diphtheria and smallpox,' but there is nowhere any suggestion that private medical research has played any part in this. At countless points throughout the proliferate 'suggestive guide,' the editors, authors and revisors seized upon opportunities to advance statism and to smear private capital."

Book Front: In *Day of Reckoning*, a novel by Ralph de Toledano (co-author of the study of the Hiss case, *Seeds of Treason*), published by Holt and Company (price $3.00; 383 Madison Ave., New York 17, N. Y.), Toledano admirably portrays the sinister activities of the GPU right in New York City, and the tragedy of an idealist caught in the cogs of that awesome engine.

● *Reflections on the Failure of Socialism* (Devin-Adair, $2.75), by Max Eastman, once a leader in American socialism. Eastman's celebrated literary style illuminates the fallacies and dangers of socialism, and the psychology of "men of good will, with strong frustrations and feeble brains, the wishful thinkers and idealistic moral cowards, the fellow-travellers of the death train." This book might well supplement the "death train" texts now used in our institutions of higher learning.

● An excellent reportorial job on Formosa, Korea and the islands — John C. Caldwell's *Still the Rice Grows Green* (Regnery Co. — $3.75). Essentially, it is the story of Free Asia — the Free Chinese in Formosa and the Free Koreans in South Korea under Syngman Rhee. The book is not only a guide to the present "friction area," it is also a guide to perusal of American press coverage on Formosa and Korea. The author debunks much of the slanted "liberal" newspaper reporting on those places.

Letter from J. EDGAR HOOVER, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation: "I read with considerable interest "Crisis of Internal Security" in the March 12, 1955, issue of HUMAN EVENTS. Your analysis of the problem of protecting the identity of confidential informants was succinct, to the point and very well stated. I did appreciate the splendid manner in which this problem was dealt with in HUMAN EVENTS and did want to express my appreciation to you."

HUMAN EVENTS, 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., is a weekly newsletter reporting from Washington on politics, business, labor, and taxes. Published usually in two sections: a 4-page news section and a 4-page article section.
Entered as second class matter at Washington, D. C. Copyright 1955.

TRIAL SUBSCRIPTION *for new subscribers only*: 8 weeks for $1. *Yearly rate, $10; 6 months, $6; 3 months, $3.* By first class mail, $11.50 a year; by airmail (including APO and FPO) $13 a year. FOREIGN: by regular mail, $12 a year; airmail, $18. Allow us 2 weeks to process new subscriptions and changes of address. Bound Annual Volume with complete index, $15. 1954 volume now ready.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vol. XII, No. 14 HUMAN EVENTS April 2, 1955

Article Section

WHY A BIG FOUR CONFERENCE?

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

JUST WHEN THE PUBLICATION of fuller records of the Yalta Conference confirm the bankruptcy of one ambitious attempt to establish a just and stable peace by personal contact between the three Mr. Bigs of that era, the conference bee begins to buzz again in some Washington bonnets.

The respected Senator George urges a Big Four meeting, on the ground that "the real hope of avoiding war is through high level conferences among the leading powers." President Eisenhower expressed himself in favor of exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France after the pacts which bring the German Federal Republic into the European defense set-up are ratified.

Contrary to a general impression on both sides of the Atlantic, there has been no unwillingness on the American side to engage in discussions with nations in the Communist bloc. About a year ago, a statistically-minded Congressman, Representative Richard H. Poff of Virginia, came up with the following facts and figures. Over a period of eight years some 120 million words have been exchanged in 3,802 meetings between United States and Communist representatives. This took 11,400 hours of talking time. It would require 600 volumes of 400 pages each to reprint all these words. And it would take one year, three months and nine days to play all these words back on a tape recorder, operating on a twenty-four hour basis.

These facts should be commended to the attention of Simple Simons on both sides of the Atlantic who believe there is some magic virtue in talk, regardless of whether the talk leads anywhere or not. In terms of positive results, the 120 million words add up to precisely zero.

Certainly the past experience of "high level" talks with totalitarian rulers is not encouraging. The first such experience was at Munich. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain thought he had brought back peace in our time. But the war which Munich was supposed to avert was a fact within less than a year.

Equally discouraging were the results of the Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill meetings at Teheran and Yalta and of the Truman-Churchill-Attlee-Stalin confab at Potsdam. Yalta is still in the limelight as a result of the publication of fuller American records of the proceedings there. These records officially confirm what earlier personal reminiscences had indicated: that Stalin got his way on every important point; that Roosevelt handed the

Published weekly at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
Copyright 1955 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet dictator the keys to Eastern Europe and to East Asia; that our allies in China, in Poland, in Eastern Europe generally were shamefully betrayed; that the German settlement was tainted with shortsighted vindictiveness.

It is both significant and amusing that the apologists for Yalta — Averell Harriman, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Stewart Alsop (Joseph being out of the country at the moment) — are invariably indignant at the publication of the fuller record. It is a natural question why they are afraid of more light, if Yalta was really an exhibit in honorable and wise statesmanship. Another inconsistency is insistence that the publication revealed nothing new and yet in some mysterious way was calculated to outrage the sensibilities of our allies.

THE TEHERAN, YALTA AND POTSDAM meetings were conducted according to a simple and disastrous formula. The Western statesmen would get from Stalin a smile and a friendly toast. The Soviet dictator would go away from the conference table with a new chunk of territory for his swollen empire. As a leading Polish diplomat said: "Our territorial integrity was signed away at Teheran; our national independence at Yalta."

The Soviet Government had no legitimate reason to be dissatisfied with its frontier at the time of the outbreak of the Second World War. There were very few Russians in the lands which fell away from the former Russian Empire; there was no question of any large Russian minority being oppressed under foreign rule.

The Soviet annexations during and since the war have been naked imperialism, and imperialism on a tremendous scale. Some twenty million people — Poles, Ukrainians, Rumanians, Letts, Estonians, Lithuanians — were taken over with their lands and incorporated into the Soviet Union. And through the device of the satellite state, ruled by a local Communist fifth-column, the manpower and natural resources of a much larger area — Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, the Soviet Zone of Germany — were added to the Soviet empire. This went beyond the wildest dreams of the most aggressive Tsars.

At the same time the Soviet position in the Far East was enormously strengthened by the removal of the check-and-balance represented by Japan and by giving the Soviet Union, for its unneeded participation in the war against Japan, a grip on such key positions in northeast Asia as Manchuria, the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin.

The build-up of this gigantic empire, the shadow of which falls more and more darkly over the rest of the world with the progress in atomic weapons, was the principal fruit of the cosy experiments in personal diplomacy at the wartime conferences. Surely no one in his right mind wants a repetition of this process of bartering substance for shadow. And there is no indication that the Communist rulers of Russia are prepared to do business on any other terms.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOR HAS THE EXPERIENCE of meeting Communists around conference tables since the end of the war been any more encouraging. Out of the 120 million words estimated by Representative Poff, no stable and reliable agreement has emerged. Two conferences of Foreign Ministers on Germany — in the spring in Moscow, in December in London — produced only deadlock. When deputy Foreign Ministers met in Paris in the spring of 1951, they wrangled for months without even being able to agree on an agenda. Another conference of Foreign Ministers on Germany, held in Berlin last spring, merely confirmed the existing deadlock, indicated the unwillingness of the Soviet Government to accept unification of Germany on the basis of free elections and free institutions and served as a prelude to a conference on Korea and Indo-China, in Geneva, which proved to be worse than a deadlock.

Geneva followed very closely the pattern of Munich, as regards Indo-China. (The status quo in Korea was not affected.) The Reds in Indo-China, who had been helped by Communist China on an enlarging scale after the unsatisfactory armistice was concluded in Korea, called off fighting on the same basis that Hitler accepted temporarily to abstain from the use of force at Munich. They got complete control of northern Indo-China, and a good chance of taking over the whole country within a two-year time limit.

No wonder Soviet and Communist newspapers look back longingly to the spirit of Yalta and cite Geneva as an example of how peace could and should be made. The Communist grand design of ultimate world conquest is unaltered. But, as rational human beings, the Soviet leaders prefer, if possible, to realize this design without incurring the risk of large-scale war. Appeasement, which is surrender on the installment plan, is quite satisfactory to them.

HAS THERE BEEN ANY CHANGE in the Moscow attitude since the death of Stalin that would give some promise of a conference which would not end either in some new retreat and surrender or in a sterile deadlock? There is no convincing sign of it. Malenkov on some occasions talked more softly than Stalin. But there was no relaxation of the Soviet position on concrete issues. And Malenkov's fall from power was accompanied by a strident affirmation of the "guns instead of butter" policy and by a shift away from the tendency (after Stalin's death) to give the Soviet consumer a somewhat easier life, at the expense of military build-up.

Only the incurably gullible and naive believe that there is any virtue in talk for talk's sake, in talk that gets nowhere. So it is up to the advocates of a big power meeting to suggest subjects which could be discussed around a conference table with some prospect of reaching a satisfactory solution.

Germany? Would there be any advantage in going over the well-trodden ground of the Berlin conference, with Western speakers calling for free elections and Soviet speakers evading the question or brazenly claiming that totalitarian voting is truly free? The

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet leaders have so often affirmed that German rearming means an end of discussion of German reunification; therefore some time must pass before they could be expected to forget their own words.

It may be argued that the West achieved a new position of power by reaching, at long last, an agreement for the rearming of the German Federal Republic as a member of a West European alliance. But divisions on paper are very different from divisions in being. The West will gain diplomatic strength only if and as the projected German army becomes a reality.

If a conference on Germany promises nothing but confirmation of a long-existing deadlock, a conference on the Far East holds grave possibilities of disastrous defeat.

On the issue of holding the offshore islands, Matsu and Quemoy, which are important outposts for the defense of Formosa and essential to the maintenance of Chinese Nationalist morale, the United States would enter a conference isolated and exposed to pressure even from Great Britain and Canada. It is easy to imagine how Soviet diplomacy would seek to exploit this rift.

Even on the defense of Formosa, to which the United States is committed by treaty, the attitude of the British Government has been wobbly and ambiguous. The attitude of the Labor Opposition has been completely defeatist. There has been little difference between the speeches of the Attlee "moderates" and those of the anti-American Bevanite left-wingers. A prudent American diplomacy would avoid an international discussion of Far Eastern issues like the plague.

Disarmament? From the promises at Yalta of "free unfettered elections" in Poland to the armistice in Korea, where the truce supervision terms have been violated over and over again, the Communist record of bad faith has been monotonously consistent. Would the American people ever consent to entrust the security, perhaps the very physical existence of their country to a paper agreement with a government that has so often broken its word? Not unless we have lost our instinct for national survival.

Psychologically there are many disadvantages about a conference. The prospect raises illusory hopes and lulls vigilance. Instead of going down this blind alley again it would be wise to recall the attitude of Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, when the Soviet Government in 1923 was bidding for a conference on recognition. If the Soviet Government wanted to comply with American terms, it could do so, said Mr. Hughes. Otherwise there was nothing to talk about. In the last thirty years no one has improved on his method for dealing with Communists.

Additional Copies of the 4-page article; 6 for $1; 10 for $1.50; 50 for $5.50; 100 for $10; 500 for $15; 1,000 for $25.
Quotations for larger quantities on request.

HUMAN EVENTS, published at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C., is a weekly newsletter reporting from Washington on politics, business, labor and taxes. It was founded in 1944 by Frank C. Hanighen. It is usually published in two parts: a 4-page news-section and a 4-page article. $10 a year. *Trial subscription for new subscribers only: 8 weeks for $1.*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED